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  • The Gradual Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo
    Introduction This year marked the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, the non-use of nuclear weapons has remained the single most significant phenomenon of the nuclear age. Central to any discussion of global nuclear politics is the term nuclear taboo, which refers to a de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo is not the act of non-use itself, but the deeply rooted belief that such use is illegitimate. This belief has endured for nearly 80 years, but the foundations are beginning to crack. While the nuclear taboo has historically played a significant role in limiting the use of nuclear weapons, contemporary geopolitical shifts, rhetorical normalisation of nuclear use, and the weakening of nuclear diplomacy indicate a gradual erosion of this norm. What the world is now witnessing is an exponential increase in stockpiles, an escalation in nuclear rhetoric, and the erosion of arms control regimes. In the meantime, there is also an acceleration in the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons, with the rising geopolitical tensions. Escalating Nuclear Rhetoric Rhetoric holds a constitutive role when it comes to international politics. We can see how the power of language can shape issues such as national identity or give birth to social movements. One of the reasons why the tradition of nuclear non-use is a taboo, but not only a norm, is the subjective and intersubjective sense of taboo-ness. It manifests itself in how nuclear weapons have been discussed and interpreted over the years. How state actors speak about nuclear use is critical in altering the normative structures governing their use. For instance, in January 2024, Israeli Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu made headlines by commenting that a "nuclear attack" was an option in case of Gaza. His remark was eventually met with international outrage, which led to his suspension from cabinet meetings. More worryingly, it signalled a normalisation of extreme language when referring to conflict and war. From the East…and the West Only a matter of months after Eliyahu's statement on Gaza, a similar shift in rhetoric was adopted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. He expanded Moscow's nuclear doctrine to allow any conventional attack by non-nuclear states that were allied to a nuclear power to be met with a nuclear strike, as if they themselves were armed with nuclear weapons. In April 2025, the senior Iranian official Ali Larijani declared that Iran would be obliged to reevaluate its nuclear stance, should the Western powers act irresponsibly. This sharply contrasted with Iran's former assertions that aimed to maintain its intentions were peaceful about its nuclear program. The erosion of conventional deterrence after direct strikes by Israel and the United States eventually developed into nuclear signalling. Rhetoric from the West, particularly following the return of Donald Trump to power, has become more confrontational. This hardening stance has likely led to the changing perception of a threat to Iran, paving the way for miscalculation. Moreover, the growing normalisation of aggressive nuclear signalling across conflict zones increases the risk of escalation and misjudgment. In a recent statement, President Donald Trump defended the American strikes against Iran. He compared them to the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which, according to him, brought an end to the Second World War. This type of language promotes the rhetorical normalisation of escalation by reframing the conversation around nuclear use, which eats away at the taboo over time. A world that is rearming at an alarming rate What makes this rhetorical shift more alarming is the material reality that accompanies it. As nuclear discourse grows more casual, nuclear states overtly invest in hard (military) power, as evidenced by the record levels of global military expenditure. In 2024, global defence sp...
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  • #Wavell Reviews A Risk Too Far: A Psychological Autopsy of the Planning for Arnhem by Gary Buck
    You may have thought that another book on Arnhem was not necessary or that it could not possibly tell you anything you did not already know about this iconic battle from World War Two. However, Gary Buck's new book, A Risk Too Far, takes a new and novel approach to the subject that has you reappraising the commonly held views and your own long-held conceptions. Whilst past commentators have been quick to apportion blame for the planning and execution of Operation Market Garden, Buck seeks to ask why and how errors might have been made. A Risk Too Far blends historical research with psychological models and theories to examine the different cognitive influences and biases that individuals face when making decisions under stressful conditions. It focuses on three of the prominent commanders of Operation Market Garden: Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, the commander of 21st Army Group who first conceived of the operation; Lieutenant-General 'Boy' Browning, the deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army and overall tactical commander for the operation; and Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division. It draws on both primary and secondary sources including memoirs, personal letters and reflections of both the subjects and their superiors and subordinates. Whilst referencing important psychological theories and models, the book is structured around the OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop which will be familiar to military readers. In so doing, Buck deftly brings out the human element of conflict, putting one in the shoes of those commanders, seeking to understand the decisions taken against the context and pressure they were under. Studying Montgomery and the strategic level, Buck asks why he choose to embark on such a high-risk operation when he was usually so deliberate, meticulous, and careful? He examines the problems of supply and an acute manpower shortage faced by 21st Army Group that were becoming critical in the face of stiffening German resistance. Monty's options are considered in light of the political impetus to prevent further V2 launches against London and his growing frustration with Eisenhower's insistence on a broad front strategy. Analysing his character, Buck finds that Montgomery was facing acute pressures and had succumbed to what is known as a grip reaction in which he abandoned his normal analytical logical approach. Operation Market Garden was a gamble, but he had decided that it was worth it. For that to be true it needed some likelihood of success. For that, Buck turns to the operational level and Lieutenant General 'Boy' Browning. Examining 'Boy' Browning we find that he was pushing for use of the First Allied Airborne Army, accepted risks in planning, and inexplicably opted to deploy his own Corps HQ in the first lift. A colourful character driven by pride and ambition, he was concerned with the diminishing possibilities for field command and to prove the continued utility of airborne forces. Faced with similar pressures to Montgomery, he was too optimistic and failed to raise concerns about a plan that could only really be successful under the best circumstances and with a significant amount of luck. At the tactical level, Buck asks why Urquhart's plan was so rigid and lacking in focus to the extent that only one battalion ever made it to the bridge in Arnhem? He examines how his lack of airborne experience led him to fall back on inadequate experience, to make illogical decisions under time pressure and to not question clear failings in the plan over a fear that his division might be broken up to solve Monty's manpower shortage. A Risk Too Far presents a thorough investigation of the span of strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the operation. It provides considerable food for thought with regards to how other fateful operations may have been planned and executed under similar circumstances. Usefully, Buck also articulates the ways in which c...
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  • Ancient Arts, Modern Ethics, and the New Battlefield
    The recent Defence Committee report, Defence in the Grey Zone, brings renewed focus to the challenge of hostile activity below the threshold of conventional war. The term 'Grey Zone' suggests a novel ambiguity, a modern strategic dilemma born of new technologies; this ambiguous environment challenges not only our strategic doctrines but also our classical ethical frameworks for conflict. However, while the character of this struggle is undeniably new, its foundational principles are not. The Grey Zone is the modern evolution of ancient principles of statecraft, supercharged by technology and the unique vulnerabilities of a hyperconnected world. To navigate this strategic evolution requires both re-understanding the classical strategists, from Sun Tzu and Kautilya to Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, while simultaneously grappling with profound ethical questions they could never have envisioned. The Timeless Why The strategic intent underpinning Grey Zone activity, to "coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function", is as old as statecraft itself. It is the practical application of "the acme of skill" according to Sun Tzu's Art of War: "to subdue the enemy without fighting". This ideal, which finds echoes in the "silent war" of Kautilya's Arthashastra, offers an intellectual foundation for modern Grey Zone Operations. From a Consequentialist perspective - where morality is based on outcomes alone - this is a grim yet vital calculus aimed at avoiding the greater evil of devastating state-on-state conflict. The report is replete with modern manifestations of ancient approaches. The use of propaganda and disinformation, "driving a wedge between social groups", is a direct heir to the classical strategy of attacking an adversary's societal cohesion. Sun Tzu notes that "all warfare is based on deception", while Kautilya takes this further, highlighting Bheda (sowing dissent) as one of the four primary tools of statecraft. The employment of "proxies, including sub-state actors such as rebel groups, mercenaries, criminal gangs, or cyber 'hacktivists'", offers the same plausible deniability sought by ancient spymasters. Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies for gaining intelligence and manipulating the enemy, while Kautilya describes vast and intricate spy networks as the primary tool for both internal control and external influence. The report's observation that "attribution of grey zone activity is often challenging" is equally neither a new nor unforeseen problem but the intended outcome of a strategy designed to achieve political effect while adhering to the Jus Ad Bellum ('justice to war', the principles governing righteous initiation of war) principle of Right Intention (from the aggressor's perspective at least) by avoiding an overt act of war. The goal, now as then, is to weaken the adversary from within, making them politically, economically, and socially unable to resist. The Transformative What While the strategic why is timeless, the what - the nature of modern warfare and in particular that of the Grey Zone challenge - has fundamentally transformed. Technology has not merely supplied new tools for the strategist's arsenal, but created entirely new domains of conflict and systemic vulnerabilities that are without historical precedent. The report correctly states that "technology has magnified the impact and global reach of grey zone attacks, and identified new areas for prosecuting operations that did not exist a generation ago, particularly regarding cyberattacks". This has created a geographically boundless cyber domain where adversaries may conduct countless operations on a scale, and at a rate, previously unimaginable - such as the "over 90,000 sub-threshold attacks" launched against the MoD's networks over just two years. This digital dependency has birthed a new critical national vulnerability: the physical infrastructure of the internet. The report highlights the "approximately 60 under...
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  • Integrated strategy and Human Security outcomes: The British Army's engineering surveys in Albania
    Aligned to His Majesty's Government (HMG) priorities of curtailing irregular migration and associated connections to human trafficking from Albania, efforts to address the drivers of migration and organised crime at source are underway. The British Army's ongoing specialist survey work in Albania's Kukës Subterranean Complex (KSC) may lead to livelihood creation, mitigating some of the risk factors of human trafficking. This demonstrates the military instrument's contribution to Human Security. UK Strategy on Irregular Migration from Albania Enabled in large part by online messaging applications such as TikTok Albanians made up a quarter of all arrivals to the UK by small boats at a reported peak in 2022. The UK's Home Affairs Committee June 2023 report details the legal, social and political context of migration to the UK from Albania. Three key drivers identified are: 1. Economic migration because of Albania's comparative poverty 2. Refugees (particularly women) who have been trafficked or made modern slaves; and 3. Organised crime In 2023 and 2024, the UK returned more Albanians (2624) by nationality than any other, but irregular detections from Albania continued throughout 2024 (825). Time should be taken to understand migration terms and figures (see here), but the key takeaway is that the UK's intent is to reduce migration and where possible, minimise push factors at source To achieve this effect, cross-government strategy in partnership with international state and non-state partners has been pursued, complimented by a plethora of UK-Albania bilaterals, culminating in a Bilateral Cooperation Plan signed in December 2022 which centred around 'security and home affairs' with a focus on 'organised crime and illegal immigration'. Development of Kukës city - a vulnerable area prone to criminality and trafficking 'from which a substantial proportion of Albanian emigration to the UK occurs' - has been recognised as means to combat emigration. The UK has already worked with local NGOs, UNICEF and conducted fact finding missions in Kukës on perceptions and drivers of emigration. Defence Integrating into UK Strategy On 17 July 2023, the then Secretary for Defence Ben Wallace received Albanian Defence Minister Niko Peleshi in London, with former Minister of State Baroness Goldie later signing a Statement of Intent (SoI) between the two MoDs with Peleshi. The SoI is wide ranging, and leaves plenty of scope for 'any new potential areas of cooperation'. Likely by design, the SoI does not detail expected outcomes, but does list some specific outputs, one of which includes 'infrastructural development'. While the military instrument is not positioned as the lead actor in counter-trafficking efforts, those drafting the SoI seem aware that military activity could contribute meaningfully to the conditions which reduce trafficking risk. The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) form completed for bilateral activity reinforces this interpretation. The military engagement is framed in terms of defence engagement, recognising 'representatives of other [Albanian] government and academic institutions also attend activity delivered by the UK Defence Section in support of UK Partners Across Government'. The effect is subtle but significant: rather than overstate Defence's role, the SoI and OSJA position military activity as a potential discreet net contributor to broader foreign policy and Human Security outcomes - reduction of emigration and associated trafficking through targeted development programmes at source. In this context, the absence of outcome language should be read not as an oversight, but as policy discipline. It reflects a conscious decision to align with HMG objectives without mischaracterising the military's role or inadvertently committing Defence to outcomes it alone cannot deliver. The Plan 'Exploring the potentials of the tunnels' was agreed as an output in the Defence and Security Bilateral Cooperation planned o...
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  • Identification/Mission First in the Digital Age
    This brief presents a strategic imperative. The development of the IMF is consistently bound by a very complex set of messaging - not just within the MoD but also across its supplier base - whereby interlinking technology, organisational and institutional change is hindering scalability across 'The Stack'. Increasingly, the three components of technology, people, and change need to be brought together using simple themes of design, build, secure and deliver to create the required capability positioning both within the MoD and its acquisition processes. This will demand a unifying plan/approach by the MoD to manage and exploit fully the IMF approach - consolidating a range of individual components such as cloud, security, et, under a cohesive plan/framework to support operational outcomes.[/note] to embed an Identification/Mission First (IMF) framework at the core of UK Defence. In the face of rising digital threats and rapid technological evolution, the UK must shift from legacy force structures to an agile, information-led defence model where identification, not just firepower, drives operational advantage. IMF is defined as the ability to collect, process, and exploit information faster and more effectively than adversaries, seamlessly connecting Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Logistics (including Medical), Command and Control (C2), and FIRES. This is both a technological and behavioural shift, aligning with modern warfare doctrines such as UK Fusion Doctrine, NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop.1 In an increasingly congested, contested, and connected battlespace, information superiority - not platform superiority - is the decisive edge, with speed of identification and mission alignment emerging as critical differentiators. As such, data must be treated as a strategic asset, akin to oil in the 20th century, requiring ethical prioritisation, protection, and operationalisation. Furthermore, civilian digital infrastructure, including social media and undersea cables, forms a crucial part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ecosystem, and must be lawfully integrated into defence strategies.2 To operationalise these imperatives, several core recommendations are identified and proposed. Under Leadership and Governance, Defence should appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for Identification/Mission First (IMF) and establish a Digital Identification Task Force under Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) to oversee strategy, ethics, and innovation. In terms of Workforce and Skills, it is essential to build a pipeline of data-literate, ethics-conscious strategists, and to incentivise digital fluency across all services through tailored career pathways. Regarding Investment and Architecture, Defence must prioritise sovereign, interoperable digital systems with low latency and secure data exchange, while embedding real-time, multi-domain identification layers into command, control (C2), and ISR platforms. For Operational Integration, IMF capabilities should be embedded into Joint Action doctrine and field exercises, and open-source intelligence should be harnessed through structured, policy-governed approaches. Finally, under Strategic Communication and Ethics, a Defence-wide Digital Ethics and Law Compliance Framework must be established, alongside clearly defined red lines for the use of private and civilian digital systems in targeting and surveillance. These measures collectively aim to ensure that Defence maintains its competitive edge through agile, ethical, and integrated information dominance Introduction Digital connectivity and rapid technological change have redefined modern warfare, where information superiority increasingly determines success. While kinetic force retains importance, digital tempo - the speed and effectiveness of information-action cycles - has become decisive.3 The MoD remains constrained by legacy structures ...
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