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  • What Makes a Good Military Coalition Partner?
    The United States Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, recently commented that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which existed between 2001-2014, colloquially stood for 'I saw Americans fighting' at a recent Capitol hearing.1 Hegseth was giving evidence in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee when he made the comment, which complements the current Trump Administration's of America-First foreign policy,2 in that European countries should not rely on American military support and that Europe should be pulling its weight more in support of collective defence. Hegseth further added that, 'what ultimately was a lot of flags, was not a lot of ground capability, you're not a real coalition unless you have real defense capabilities and real armies can bring those to bear and that's a reality Europe is waking up to quickly'.3 Senator Chris Coon, a Democrat who sat on the Committee, was quick to clarify that other military partners served and died within Afghanistan.4 In an unpredictable world this exchange provoked a key thought, what makes a good military coalition partner, seen from a Western perspective? Brief History of Military Coalitions Forming military coalitions based on shared strategic goals is not a new concept. Pragmatically, it makes sense to form military coalitions to share capabilities/equipment, to act as a deterrence, and to form international legitimacy against any action against a common adversary. Even the mighty Spartan Army fought alongside a military alliance with other Greek soldiers when threatened by the Persian Empire in the 5th Century BCE. According to Herodotus, there were only 300 Spartan Royal bodyguards in comparison to thousands of other Greeks who fought against the Persians.5 However, these Spartans were portrayed as warriors who were disciplined and highly trained in comparison to other Greek soldiers.6 Facing a force of a hundred thousand Persian soldiers, the odds were against the Greeks. Were the Spartans a better coalition partner than the other Greeks as they had alleged quality over quantity, or was mass required? The eventual defeat of the Greeks at the Battle of Thermopylae and sacking of Athens, perhaps for this specific battle, meant that simply more Greeks were needed to match the Persians. Moving forward to the 21st Century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created in 1949. ISAF was formed after the events of 9/11, when Article 5 was triggered, but it was in 2003 when NATO took the lead of the UN mission in Afghanistan. At the height of the mission, 51 NATO and partner nations provided troops.7 With six different ISAF objectives and the whole of Afghanistan divided into five (later six in 2010) Regional Commands, ISAF members held various roles and responsibilities. For example, Regional Command North was commanded by Germany with troops from Sweden, Hungary, and Norway supporting the various missions.8 Troop numbers and equipment supplied varied across ISAF, with the United States contributing the most significant number of troops by some margin. This tragically resulted in greater deaths, with the United States losing nearly 2500 military personnel in comparison to a country like Georgia, in which 29 military personnel were killed.9 When compared against the population size of Georgia (a non-NATO country), the deaths experienced in Afghanistan resulted in a death per million rating of 8.42, higher than the United States at 7.96. However, it is ethically challenging to compare the number of casualties experienced by each partner. As such, measuring casualty figures by each coalition partner is not an efficient way to determine if each country is 'pulling its weight'. Another significant military coalition was formed in 2014. The Global Coalition against Daesh originally had 13 members, but today has 87 partners and is designed to degrade and ensure Daesh's enduring defeat.10 In September 2014, President Obama commented in a majo...
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  • Principle-Based Close-Combat Training
    Europe's NATO members can gain an operational advantage by reframing close-combat training. However, with the current Combatives models, this change would add burden to both time-in-training and financial resources. Seizing this opportunity would require replacing the current technique/MMA-based models with a leaner model. To this end, alternative options offer increased functional expertise and substantial reductions in time and cost allocations. To demonstrate this, we can use "time-in-training" to compare costs-and-time allotments against the achieved level of functional expertise. The technique-based models: For this comparison, the U.S. Army's current MMA-based Combatives training-model is a well-documented program. Here, 40-hours of training produces a "questionable" level-1 proficiency. An additional 80-hours produces a Level 2 proficiency. A combined total of 440-hours achieves the top level-4 proficiency. However, the average U.S. soldier only holds a level-1 or level-2 rating. The statement of "questionable" proficiency is founded in the comparison of four scientific points; 1. Developing functional expertise: Functional expertise in MMA techniques require extensive repetition. 2500 to 3000 repetitions of technique are required to create the most basic mental-map (muscle-memory). This requirement increases with complexity. MMA techniques are complex. For example - Level 1 has a minimum of 8 phases, each with multiple individual techniques. Achieving basic functionality in any one phase equals 2500 times the number of techniques it contains. 1. Situational Awareness and Avoidance 2. Stress Management and Decision Making 3. Dominant Body Positions, range & range transitions, and body control, (a key principle) 4. Basic striking and defensive techniques 5. Grappling, throws, takedowns, clinch, chokes, and knee defense 6. Introductory rifle/knife based Combatives 7. Techniques for creating distance and disengaging from an opponent 8. Realistic Training and Application 2. Retention of functional expertise: Retention of functional expertise in complex techniques is low. Retention of a complex movements (effective expertise) depends on repetitions and the time since last practiced. The factors listed below negatively affect retention. 1. How natural the movement is - Generally MMA techniques are not natural movements. 2. The complexity of the movement - Generally MMA techniques are complex. 3. The frequency between initial-training and recurrent training - MMA requires high frequencies. 3. The deterioration of fine movement under stress: MMA methods include fine-motor techniques. High psychological/physiological stresses cause fine-motor deterioration. Deterioration begins at 145 heart-rate (BPM). The more complex a movement is, the more it deteriorates. 4. Somatic-markers: Somatic-markers determine access to mental-maps (techniques). "Somatic-markers" store, sort, and select physical movement. Somatic-markers use rapid-sorting to determine selection. The most practised mental-maps are the quickest; lesser used maps are slower. As counter-point, I am well versed in W.E. Fairbairn's "Gutter Fighting", so I will speak from that as an alternate option. In comparison with the MMA model, Gutter Fighting's battle-proven model achieves a higher-than-average functionality in less than 40- hours. Completing the U.S.'s level-1 and 2 models will require 120-hours; completing the Gutter Fighting model will require 40-hours. 80-hours is a massive time/cost reduction. These savings will repeat every time the program is run. These are time/cost saving that can be reallocated to greater advantage elsewhere. Conversely, the MMA model repeats their double-rate-loss every time its program is run. The Gutter Fighting Variant: 1. Developing functional expertise: Principle-based, Gutter Fighting is very natural. Training installs a small toolbox of techniques that personally fit the user. This natural ease-of-execution accelerates efficiency,...
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  • Bullshit & Botshit: Digital Sycophancy & Analogue Deference in Defence
    The recently published Strategic Defence Review (SDR)1 and National Security Strategy (NSS)2 both place accelerating development and adoption of automation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) at the heart of their bold new vision for Defence. I've written elsewhere3 about the broader ethical implications,4 but want here to turn attention to the 'so what?', and particularly the 'now what?' Specifically, I'd like to explore a question SDR itself raises, of "Artificial Intelligence and autonomy reach[ing] the necessary levels of capability and trust" (emphasis added). What do we actually mean by this, what is the risk, and how might we go about addressing it? The proliferation of AI, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), promises a revolution in efficiency and analytical capability.5 For Defence, the allure of leveraging AI to accelerate the 'OODA loop' (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) and maintain decision advantage is undeniable. Yet, as the use of these tools becomes more widespread, a peculiar and potentially hazardous flaw is becoming increasingly and undeniably apparent: their propensity to 'hallucinate' - to generate plausible, confident, yet entirely fabricated and, importantly, false information.6 The resulting 'botshit'7 presents a novel technical, and ethical, challenge. It also finds a powerful and troubling analogue in a problem that has long plagued hierarchical organisations, and which UK Defence has particularly wrestled with: the human tendency for subordinates to tell their superiors what they believe those superiors want to hear.8 Of particular concern in this context, this latter does not necessarily trouble itself with whether that report is true or not, merely that it is what is felt to be required; such 'bullshit'9 10 is thus subtly but importantly different from 'lying', and seemingly more akin therefore to its digital cousin. I argue however that while 'botshit' and 'bullshit' produce deceptively similar outputs - confidently delivered, seemingly authoritative falsehoods, that arise not from aversion to the truth, but (relative) indifference to it, and that may corrupt judgement - their underlying causes, and therefore their respective treatments, are fundamentally different. Indeed, this distinction was demonstrated with startling clarity during the research for this very paper. Mistaking one for the other, and thereby applying the wrong corrective measures, poses a significant threat to strategic thinking and direction, and Operational Effectiveness. By understanding the distinct origins of machine-generated 'botshit' and human-generated 'bullshit', we can develop more robust and effective approaches to the envisioned future of hybrid human-machine decision-making. A familiar flaw: human deference and organisational culture The Chilcot Inquiry11 served as a stark reminder of how easily institutional culture can undermine sound policy. In his introductory statement to the report,12 Sir Chilcot noted that "policy […] was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments", but more to the point that "judgements […] were presented with a certainty that was not justified" and that "they were not challenged, and they should have been." He further emphasised "the importance of […] discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge" and that "above all, the lesson is that all aspects […] need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour." He was saying, very clearly and repeatedly, that this was not simply a failure of intelligence collection or strategic calculation; it was a failure of culture. The decision-making process exposed an environment where prevailing assumptions went untested and the conviction of senior leaders created a gravitational pull, warping the information presented to them to fit a desired narrative. Chilcot highlights how an environment in which decisions are based on eminence (also eloquence and vehemence) rather than evidence13 encourages t...
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  • What a British-Led Military Contingent in Ukraine Could Look Like
    The Russian invasion of Ukraine, in its full-scale war for the third year with level overall years of conflict, is reaching a critical moment where both Kyiv's and Moscow's will to fight comes down to attrition. Under the second Trump Administration, peace talks and proposals of frozen lines have taken place with NATO members, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksy, and Russian President and longtime autocrat Vladimir Putin. The United Kingdom and other continental heavyweights such as France and Germany have discussed a major European peacekeeping contingent if the Russian invasion of Ukraine mirrors the Korean War conclusion with frozen lines. Nevertheless, challenges will remain regarding the deployment of a British-led contingent. Substantial safeguards will be necessary for deployed European forces in Ukraine, who will have different rules of engagement compared to those in prior combat deployments in Mali, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, questions will remain regarding the adequate allocation of rotational force among each contributing country, the stability of Ukraine, and the support from the United States for the peacekeeping proposals. Potential Peacekeeping Operations in Ukraine On March 15, 2025, during a high-level virtual meeting in London, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer proposed plans to potentially send 10,000 peacekeeping troops to Ukraine, which would be led by British forces. The 10,000 is the official estimate of the overall number of European soldiers proposed to be sent, with the majority being British and French, as Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated to The Sunday Times. Several days later, France also committed to the proposal as French President Emmanuel Macron had previously proposed sending troops to Ukraine as Russia's wartime capabilities continue to grow. Other countries that could potentially join the 'coalition of the willing' include Finland, Sweden, Turkey, Estonia, Lithuania, and others. Deployments in Ukraine would have to be based in and around the contact lines, which are currently unknown. Despite the substantial casualties, the Russian military has advanced - albeit through increments - particularly in the Donetsk oblast. In case of further Russian aggression after a ceasefire, putting Western troops on potential contact points could not only deter Russian military action but free up Ukrainian forces tied down in former combat zones such as Northern Ukraine. If the lines were to be frozen under diplomatic pressure with both exhausted Ukrainian and Russian forces, the British-led contingent could be deployed in key sectors. Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, the left bank of Kherson, and the border with Belarus would need to be manned to deter further Russian aggression with command-and-control centers in Kyiv and Odesa. Hurdles Over the Deployment and Rotational Abilities of European Forces The implementation of a peacekeeping contingent will need to be considered several factors, including the rotational capabilities of each participating nation, the number of troops allocated by each country, and the potential political ramifications at home. The United Kingdom and France can provide sizable contingents of troops that would not affect mission readiness for other areas of operations. However, other European countries may struggle to rotate their own. Furthermore, questions remain over the length of the mission, such as how long the commitment of British and allied forces will be and whether it will fall under NATO command or a task force solely allocated for Ukraine. Each deployment would be about 3-6 months, and other countries would need to step up. Finland, despite having the continent's largest reserve army, has a small full-time defense force. Other countries that are staunch supporters of Ukraine, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, also have small militaries and would need to balance out the small contingents each country would...
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  • Vegan Uniform: Why wouldn't we?
    The recently reported move by the RAF to manage supply of vegan alternative uniforms on request, whilst not necessarily quite as new as it may seem, may initially appear to challenge military identity, organisational culture, and the nature and Operational Effectiveness of a modern fighting force. But whilst I'm not vegan myself and therefore won't be taking advantage of this policy, I believe that it's a sensible and entirely appropriate step forward, that strengthens the RAF by demonstrating its commitment to its people, broadening its appeal to potential recruits, and reinforcing its ethical foundations without compromising Operational Effectiveness. There's been a lot of hate and derision over this, on social media, in various media outlets, and sadly even in the Service itself - unfortunate but unsurprising in the current climate. But I've also received and seen some genuine and reasonable comments - some from people I greatly respect - that I think do deserve and warrant a considered response. I'm entirely uninterested in feeding trolls, but I do believe in giving and receiving reasonable challenge and engaging in respectful debate - this is my attempt to contribute to that conversation. Individualism vs Uniformity The core purpose of a uniform is to foster a collective identity and spirit, subordinating the individual to the team. The criticism is that allowing ethical variations undermines this principle. However, I'd suggest this is a misinterpretation of the meaning, intent, and value of uniformity. Uniformity is not conformity, and Unit cohesion is not threatened by diversity; indeed, combined with psychological safety and strong, effective leadership (as one would expect in a military environment), diversity enhances military organisational effectiveness. Uniformity in the military is therefore about common standards and unity of purpose, not the literal, molecular composition of every item. A Service person's identity and function are defined by their rank slide, trade badge, and the uniform's cut, feel, and colour, none of which are altered by using appropriate non-animal materials. The military has a long history of accommodating deeply held beliefs without sacrificing cohesion. We accommodate religious dietary needs in rations, allow turbans and hijabs that conform to regulations, and respect religious holidays. Providing a vegan uniform option is simply a modern extension of this principle to include deeply held ethical convictions. True cohesion comes from shared values like courage, respect, and integrity, not from enforcing conformity down to the last stitch. A force that respects and values the conscience and cognitive diversity of its people strengthens the moral component, and is thus more unified and resilient. I'd also note that as long as I've been serving, personnel have always been able to source different boots and other items, to optimise their comfort. Go to any military Unit, and you'll see personnel in Altberg, Aku, Kestrel, Lowa, Meindl, and many other brands of boot - all procured through the stores issue system, and all intended to ensure individual comfort and suitability. There's very simply nothing new or controversial about accommodating individual needs to enhance performance. Cost and Resources It's argued that this is an unnecessary expense, diverting funds from more critical areas, like frontline equipment or improving pay. But the Strategic Defence Review 2025 recognises that representation, empowerment, and flexibility for our people is an investment. The cost of recruiting and training a Service person is significant - tens of thousands for a recruit and millions for a pilot. Losing even a small number of highly skilled personnel, or indeed deterring potential recruits, because of an easily solvable conflict with their (non-Operational) beliefs, costs far more to Defence than the marginal expense of sourcing alternative boots or gloves. The policy is "on request", and with MoD ...
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