Wavell Room Audio Reads

• Cheap is good enough

  With the imminent publication of the new government's first Strategic Defence Review this article throws out a challenge. Can we make the first cheap British Army division of the modern period? Can we afford not to? The 'world-beating' delusion Britain has a 'world-beating' epidemic. It would be funny if we were not paying such a high cost for this delusion. Who started it may be debated. That it has become an empty boast is indisputable. The graph below shows the frequency of use of the phrase in Parliament. It has only got worse. How is Britain world-beating? Our social statistics certainly attract attention: 40% of adults pay no income tax, because their annual income does not exceed the £12,570 personal allowance threshold; One third of 35-45 year olds in England now rents (it was one in ten at the beginning of the century), and four in every ten of the private renters is receiving housing benefit (or they would be on the street); By the time Universal Credit is fully rolled out, one in four working age households will be receiving it; Almost one fifth of Britain's school children, apparently, have special educational needs; At the other end of the scale, Britain's graduates now collectively owe around £240 billion in student loans; Over one million16-24 years olds are neither in education, employment nor training (the NEETs), the main reason cited is 'mental health', remedied by a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (over 3.3 million Britons in England and Wales were claiming a PIP last year). And so we could go on. How the British Army is 'world-beating' also raises questions. Marlborough's Grand Alliance army at the beginning of the 18th century was bigger. Cromwell had more cavalry regiments. The country that invented the tank can today deploy and sustain one tank regiment (plainly, there must be a reserve or you would be unable to rotate troops). The British Army is effectively air defenceless. In one of the most painful sagas of many in recent times, the Army will finally be receiving a new armoured personnel carrier, 20 years late, and with no weapon beyond a machinegun. And personnel statistics, perhaps reflecting wider society, do not make happy reading. Just five years ago, around 4,500 service personnel brought claims against the MOD. Today the number has jumped to almost 7,000 - or roughly, one in every 17th serviceman or woman on a parade square is making a claim against the MOD. Is serving in the (smaller) non-operational Army really so dangerous? Has the MOD become more negligent in the last five years? We can't go on like this. The first thing we must do is face reality and drop the 'world-beating' delusion. Good, better, best In the early 1960s, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara - America's most talented holder of the post in the second half of the 20th century - coined the phrase 'Good, better, best', in an interview with LIFE magazine. The Ford 'whizz kid' ('human IBM machine' was his other nickname) had been recruited by Kennedy to reform the bloated Department of Defence. He did, against some opposition. 'Good, better, best' referred to defence kit. The majority of defence kit, McNamara argued, just needs to be good. A small proportion needs to be better. And the smallest proportion needs to be 'the best'. The reason was cost. If each of the services proposed the best kit, every time, the defence budget would be bankrupted. Who knows what McNamara would make of Washington's trillion dollar defence budget today. His wisdom is certainly missed. Or cheap is good enough Or, perhaps, we could shorten McNamara's dictum and simply state cheap is good enough, most of the time. We were good at cheap. It was the foundation for what today would be called 'success stories'. The Land Rover story began in 1947 with Rover responding to a War Department requirement for a cheap, jeep-like, utility vehicle. Millions have since rolled off the production line. In contrast, a recently procured patrol vehicle (this auth...

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• A Nuclear Dilemma: Peacekeeping in Ukraine

  Introduction President Donald Trump's attempt to end the war in Ukraine continues, but for how much longer? He has recently stated that his patience is wearing thin. Even if a meaningful ceasefire materialises, the extent to which the U.S. might provide security guarantees is still unknown. One thing that appears to be clear is that European nations will be taking the lead in any peacekeeping force used to enforce whatever peace deal might be negotiated, and that NATO security guarantees, such as Article 5, may not extend to this force. This poses a unique risk when it comes to potential nuclear escalation should further conflict occur in the future. A lack of NATO security guarantees may leave a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine vulnerable to nuclear strike. A brief hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate this. The year is 2029… President Donald Trump is coming towards the end of his second term as president, and it looks like a more pro-Ukraine candidate is going to be elected. Russia, having seen a significant easing of sanctions as part of a peace deal, has reconstituted and improved its military capability and learned its mistakes from the 2022 invasion. Worried by the possibility that the U.S. will soon be more likely to intervene to defend Ukraine, President Putin decides to act. After conducting a series of false flag operations - designed to look like Ukrainian aggression - Russia launches another invasion, banking on the European peacekeeping force being unwilling to take significant casualties, and the U.S. not intervening. However, Russia still suffers from significant command and control issues, and the European nations have also improved their own military capabilities. Russian forces make little progress and suffer heavy casualties - European casualties remain surprisingly limited. In Moscow, the prospect of another failed military operation sees pressure mounting on Putin - talks of a coup swirl. Putin decides to make good on a threat that was now falling on deaf ears. Russia launches a SS-26 Stone SSM with a 10-kiloton tactical warhead. Deliberately used in a less kinetic area of the front, targeting reconnaissance forces proving routes for a potential advance, the military impact of the detonation was limited, as was intended by Russia; however, the strategic impact was huge. With the U.S. still unwilling to provide material support, despite overwhelming condemnation of Russia's actions, Europe and Ukraine struggle to come up with a response, with Russia threatening further use of its tactical nuclear weapons. Sheltering under a Anglo-French umbrella? Anyone with a vague knowledge of the Ukraine conflict could probably poke holes in the scenario above, but it illustrates a point. A peacekeeping force in Ukraine may face the risk of nuclear escalation by Russia. The U.K. and France may offer to have Ukraine under their 'nuclear umbrella'; however, with only strategic weapons at their disposal, a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike would be grossly disproportionate. Given this, any force in Ukraine needs to ensure it can deal with a nuclear strike in a conventional way. This will include ensuring maneuver forces can continue to operate in a nuclear environment, as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia will likely, at least in part, be designed to limit freedom of movement. Fighting in a nuclear environment A nuclear strike would require a military force to deal with a number of challenges. The blast itself will almost certainly lead to casualties, just like a conventional munition. The thermal radiation of even a 10-kiloton warhead is likely to cause anything flammable within hundreds of meters to ignite and cause severe burns to those in the vicinity. Ionizing radiation will soon see cases of radiation sickness beginning to appear, which, even if not fatal, will require specialized medical treatment. Residual radiation from unfissioned weapon debris and radioactive fission ...

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  9:55
• How defence SMEs can pioneer social impact in procurement

  A golden opportunity in the era of Labour's Procurement Act The dust has barely settled on Labour's Procurement Act, which kicked in back in February 2025, and defence SMEs find themselves at a crossroads. On one hand, they're facing some real headaches; on the other, there's a chance to make their mark as genuine trailblazers in social impact. With government scrutiny on spending ramping up, smaller players can actually stand out from the crowd by showing they're serious about making meaningful change happen. The changing landscape of Social Value The Social Value Act was first introduced in 2012 when 'social value' was little more than a footnote in procurement discussions. It has been on quite the ride since then. Fast forward to 2020, when we saw the introduction of a proper framework with five clear themes: COVID-19 Recovery, Tackling Economic Inequality, Fighting Climate Change, Equal Opportunity, and Wellbeing. Labour hasn't wasted any time putting its stamp on things. Rayner's 'National Procurement Plan' has teeth, making Social Value non-negotiable in contracts and holding suppliers' feet to the fire. Since February, the new Act forces both buyers and suppliers to publish their Social Value KPIs in black and white. No more hiding in the shadows. The SME challenge: David vs Goliath It's a totally different ball game for SMEs compared to the big boys. When that 10% Social Value threshold landed with PPN 06/20, industry giants barely blinked - Jacobs simply bought half a consultancy and created Simetrica-Jacobs overnight. Job done. SMEs just don't have that luxury - their piggy banks aren't big enough for that kind of splash. To make matters worse, the advice they're getting often comes from forums dominated by the very primes they're competing against. Talk about the fox guarding the henhouse! The measurement problem is another thorn in their side: current systems that love to attach pound signs to everything naturally favour those with deeper pockets. When an SME takes on one apprentice, it's a big deal for them but it gets lost in the noise when compared to a multinational hiring a small army of graduates. The SME advantage: agility and authenticity But it's not all doom and gloom. Defence SMEs have some aces up their sleeves - their nimble structure means they can weave Social Value into their DNA, rather than bolting it on as an afterthought. As smaller and more flexible businesses, SMEs have the advantage of fully integrating Social Value into their core values, culture and everyday operations. Larger businesses often struggle to retrofit Social Value,but we, at RUK have been able to build it into the fabric of everything we do. This isn't just corporate speak - it translates into real-world impact. SMEs' local roots mean they actually understand what communities need. With Labour banging the drum for regional development, that local knowledge is pure gold. They can pivot quickly, create initiatives that actually matter, and build partnerships that deliver more than just PR points. Building Defence SME success in Social Value At RUK, collaboration underpins everything we do and we believe that SMEs can punch above their weight by focusing on these partnerships that matter, creating their own bespoke tracking tools. Developing a solid Social Value strategy takes graft, but we've found that having the right relationships in place makes all the difference when bidding for contracts. For RUK, Social Value isn't a box-ticking exercise; it's central to our entire approach to winning business. SMEs can flip the script on their limitations. By zeroing in on quality rather than quantity, and developing focused initiatives that play to their strengths, they can create impact that resonates far more deeply than the scattergun approach often adopted by larger players. A call to action for government and industry For this potential to be realised, we need some fundamental changes. Government bodies must craft guidelines that...

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  5:19
• Operation Flow and the Ukrainian Withdrawal from Kursk

  In August 2024 a surprise Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast resulted in the capture of 1,376 square kilometres of Russian territory. Over the next six months the enclave was repeatedly attacked. Ukrainian-controlled territory shrunk to an area anchored on the town of Suzhda. In the second week of March the Ukrainian defence collapsed. Units withdrew to the border zone. The Russian command hailed a bold operation involving infiltration via a gas pipeline as catalyst for the Ukrainian retreat - Operacija Potok, or Operation Flow. This article assesses Operation Flow and the wider Ukrainian withdrawal from the Kursk salient. Preparations for Operation Flow Operation Flow was three weeks in the making. Command was vested in the Chechen Lieutenant-General Apti Alaudinov. Alaudinov has been a tireless self-promoter during the Kursk campaign. Operation Flow provided him with another opportunity to burnish his credentials with the Kremlin. First, methane gas residues had to be cleared from a 15 kilometre stretch of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline that runs north-east of Suzdha. This was not entirely successful and a number of soldiers were hospitalised with neurotropic poisoning. Some Russian bloggers reported suffocations. Next, ammunition, food and water had to be ferried down the pipeline on special barrows. Toilets were also sent down. One Russian channel described the conditions thus: 'Walk, crawl almost 16 kilometres through a narrow dirty tunnel 1.45 m in diameter with vapours from the remains of liquefied gas; sit in a pipe waiting for the command to storm for several more days. Breathe in methane vapours, excrement, vomit of those who were the first to be poisoned, and there is no longer any possibility of calling for evacuation from this point, when the enemy is closer than our own.' Volunteers were drawn from multiple units: 11th Airborne Brigade, 106 Airborne Brigade, 72nd Motor Rifle Division, 30th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the Veterans Airborne Assault Regiment, the Vostok Airborne Assault Regiment, and Akhmat (Chechen) special forces. A total of 800 troops were involved (General Gerasimov reported a lower number of 600 to President Putin in a later staged meeting). Due to the conditions, troops had to enter in small groups of five people with a distance of at least ten meters between groups. At halts soldiers moved a couple of meters away from each other so that they could breathe. A distance of 11-12 kilometres was covered over four days. Some spent as long as a week in the pipeline. As many as four exit points are believed to have been made in the pipeline, but possibly only one used. The Ukrainians actually intercepted communications between Russians complaining about the awful conditions in the pipeline. On Saturday 8 March the order was given to break cover and infiltrate northern Suzdha. Was the pipeline operation a success? Ukrainian reporting suggests Operation Flow achieved limited tactical success. The Ukrainian command was aware of the scheme and was keeping the pipeline under surveillance. YouTube video evidence shows a group that emerged in fields was quickly struck by artillery fire and dispersed in a nearby wood line. Another group reportedly reached a two-storey building in the industrial area of Suzdha but was destroyed. In total, Ukrainian sources report only around 100 soldiers actually emerged from the pipeline. That no Russian video or imagery was presented showing soldiers hoisting unit flags - a common practice to demonstrate success - suggests Ukrainian reporting is credible. Even so, an 82nd Air Assault Brigade soldier (the formation that engaged the Russians) also reported that although his unit was aware of the plan and repelled Russians that emerged from the pipeline, a number still managed to infiltrate the area of northern Suzdha. He told this was 'the reason why his brigade was forced to destroy part of its available equipment and withdraw from the eastern flank to the...

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  7:34
• Ukrainian Service Women

  On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, there were around 31,000 servicewomen and female MOD employees in the Ukrainian armed forces. This represented around 15% of the total force with one in ten serving as officers (but rarely above major rank). Following Soviet-era practice, servicewomen were mainly restricted to non-combat roles such as medical staff and clerks. The neglect of servicewomen was such that there were no female-standard uniforms on issue, a deficit addressed in typical Ukrainian fashion by volunteers such as the Arm Women Now project that enlisted help to sew uniforms more compatible with the female body shape. How has the war changed this? There are a lot more Ukrainian female soldiers now: Post the invasion restrictions were eventually lifted with women able to serve in any branch, subject to selection procedures. The age limit for women enlisting was also raised to 60, matching that of men. However, compulsory mobilisation remained only for males. This meant all women enlisting were, and today continue to be, volunteers. At first, recruitment was slow, mainly due to a lack of organisation and opportunities. Many found employment through 'private' recruiting (units posting job applications), rather than centralised recruiting through MOD schemes. By October 2023, female volunteer numbers had jumped 40%. But this only added another 12,000 servicewomen, bringing the total to 43,000 after two years of war. By March 2024, the numbers had risen to 62,000, including 5,000 in officer posts, and with 10,000 serving in active combat zones. By this point, 14,000 servicewomen in total had qualified as 'participants in hostilities' (effectively 'veteran' status for which there is a financial benefit). In the summer, the number rose to 67,000, but with clarification, 19,000 were 'employees with non-military tasks'. By the end of 2024, the number had stabilised around the 68,000 mark where it stands at the time of writing. The opening of over 40 nationwide recruitment centres - a programme which only started a year ago - has helped boost numbers. Today, roughly one in five applicants at the recruitment centres are women. The roles they fill are tabulated below: Female applicants at recruitment centres and roles assigned Staff positions 24% Combat medics, doctors and nurses 22% Drone units 13% Chefs 12% Snipers (shooting specialists) 6% Communications and Cyber 6% Psychologists 3% Examples of frontline service have been varied. In March 2024, the first all-female drone unit was raised. Tetyana Bondarenko was a theatre actress before the war. Today she is call sign 'Bond' (after 007) and an expert drone pilot. Layla, call sign Saratsyn, a former IT worker with striking red dreadlocks, now commands a drone strike unit. Olga Yehorova - a keen sportswoman before the war - is an example of female sniper. She has been wounded twice, once catching shell splinters in her stomach ('the pain became unbearable' she remembered), and on a second occasion receiving a bloodied eye from a shell blast. Liudmyla Meniuk joined 24th Aidar Separate Assault Battalion in 2016 and eventually progressed from clerk, to chief sergeant of an assault company, to commander of an armoured service unit. Some have achieved fame: in November 2024 soldier Natalia Hrabarchuk downed a cruise missile with a MANPADs. Before the war she was a kindergarten teacher. This was her first launch. From left to right, and top to bottom: Sniper Olga Yehorova, theatre actress now drone pilot Tetyana Bondarenko, Commander of Armoured Service Unit Liudmyla Meniuk, and former IT worker today strike drone platoon commander Layla. Former kindergarten teacher Natalia Hrabarchuk downs a cruise missile with a MANPADs then falls to her knees with the realisation of what she has just achieved. Source: United 24 Media It is not all about the frontline. Servicewomen also serve in the GUR and SBU (Intelligence Directorate and Security Service) where they have been praised for their ...

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