Wavell Room Audio Reads

• Is Autonomy the End of the Naval Warfare Officer

  The end of the Warfare Officer? You're not unskilled, they're the wrong skills. In a rain-beaten marina on a rugged coastline, near a nameless village more familiar with fishing than fleet operations, a teenage Able Seaman sits inside a converted shipping container. Watching a laptop screen, they remotely pilot a small crewless boat through choppy waters via a suite of cameras and RADAR feeds. For all intents and purposes, they are the Captain. Down the road, on a slipway framed with lobster pots and fishing gear, a Petty Officer and Leading Hand haul 15-metres of uncrewed craft onto a trailer. With a police escort arranged and explosives securely stowed in a separate vehicle, they tow it down narrow B-roads to its next launch site. Followed by a small convoy of HGVs containing ancillary equipment and spares. Armed with little more than an expense account the skill to reverse an oversized trailer, they fulfil the traditional roles of Navigator and Officer of the Watch where moving naval fighting capabilities is concerned. These scenes stand in stark contrast to the age-old image of a Commanding Officer directing a Frigates movement across open sea from his chair on the bridge. Modern navies are undergoing a seismic shift in relevance, away from the skill set of their senior officers who cut their teeth on 5,000-tonne, 130-metre warships and bigger, and toward young operators and technicians independently deploying tiny uncrewed systems from the backs of lorries to greater maritime effect. The hierarchy of most navies has long been built around crewing entire flotillas of ships, with only a limited number of shore-based roles supporting operations from the rear. But the rise of autonomous platforms is disrupting that structure, challenging the relevance of the traditional command pipeline. In tomorrow's navy, do expert leaders qualified in seamanship and commanding operations from capital ships offer more value than an Able Seaman who can command multiple vessels from a single screen? What does it mean to grow officers through the classic path of shipboard appointments when the conventional warship is fast becoming the exception, not the rule? If most naval capability in the future is delivered from shore, operated remotely, or automated entirely, then is the role of the seagoing 'sailor' now something rare and specialised, less a core function and more a niche within a much broader system biasing towards land operations with maritime effectors deployed at reach? Today, battles at sea are already being won by lone teenagers remotely piloting a USV with helm controls mapped to a modified Xbox controller and laptop from miles away, supported by a mechanic with a Cat C+E licence hauling the latest capability on a trailer, as by a seasoned commander on the bridge of a warship with charge of a crew several hundred strong. Modern Navies are discovering that expertise in the latest iteration of nautical skills no longer guarantees expert opinion in utilising modern technology. This article argues that autonomy and uncrewed systems are reshaping naval power, placing greater importance on digital literacy and low level mechanical skills found in trades once considered vocational, rather than the strategic conversations based on traditional strategic warfare roles. Navies around the world are rapidly adopting uncrewed systems, on the surface, underwater, and in the air, to take on roles once reserved for fully crewed warships. The U.S. Navy's Ghost Fleet Overlord programme, for example, fields 90-metre drone ships that have sailed thousands of miles and even launched missiles under remote supervision by operators too junior to stand a traditional bridge watch. Australia has followed suit with Sentinel, a converted patrol boat and now the country's largest autonomous vessel, monitored by a skeleton crew of engineers camping onboard and advanced autonomy software. The Royal Navy, meanwhile, has demonstrated this shift through its NavyX...

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  14:53
• On Warrior Culture

  Editor's note: This piece is slightly different to our normal ones. It's more akin to a blog and written in the first person. However, we deemed it interesting given the writer, where they are, and the wider context. Although I am not an infantryman, I am assigned to an infantry unit here in the USA. At our recent dining out, talk inevitably turned to Saint Maurice. For those who do not know, Saint Maurice is the patron saint of infantrymen. When it came time for the commander to induct a select few into the Order of Saint Maurice, I heard the script - which includes the story of Saint Maurice - as if it was for the first time. Maurice was ordered to have his legionnaires offer pagan sacrifices before battle near the Rhone at Martigny. The Theban Legion refused to participate, and also refused to kill innocent civilians in the conduct of their duty, and withdrew to the town of Agaunum. Enraged, Maximian ordered every tenth man killed, yet they still refused. A second time the General ordered Maurice's men to participate and again they refused. Maurice declared his earnest desire to obey every order lawful in the eyes of God. "We have seen our comrades killed," came the reply. "Rather than sorrow, we rejoice at the honor done to them." I had been in a funk for the preceding few weeks. Like all members of the profession of arms I had been trying to make sense of the changes in Department policy and U.S. foreign policy that had been cascading out of the National Command Authority. Everything seemed to be in flux. Opinions among my peers differed. Nothing seemed to make sense. And then I heard this story and suddenly I felt better. I am not a religious man. And even if I were, the religion of my ancestors did not include the veneration of saints (if you must know, I'm Jewish, but you can only get military inspiration from the stories of the Maccabean Revolt so many times before you need to look further afield for inspiration). But in a time when everyone is talking about "warrior culture" - and not necessarily in a way that made good sense - the story of Saint Maurice seemed like it held some sort of answer. As a good cavalryman, I went straight to the story of Saint George. As a result of his personal bravery, this man - then known as Nestor of Cappodocia - became a member of the Roman Emperor Diocletian's personal bodyguard. In 303 AD, Diocletian issued an edict in Nicodemia, now a part of Turkey, that ordered the destruction of all Christian Churches, sacred writings and books, and outlawing all Christians who did not, on the surface at least, conform to paganry. Upon seeing the edict, Nestor tore it down. For his act and his refusal to abide by the pagan emperor's edict, Nestor was imprisoned, tortured, and executed. Early Christians changed Nestor's name to George, and he became associated with bravery, dedication to faith, and decency. The legend of St. George's defeating the dragon perpetuates the might of the mounted warrior over the forces of evil. It is an Italian legend dating from the 12th Century, and the story goes like this: Near the city of Silene, a frightful dragon came to live in a marshy swamp, and its breath poisoned all who attempted to drive it away. To protect themselves, the citizens offered the dragon two sheep every day. Soon, however, they ran out of sheep, and human sacrifices were then drawn by lot. One day, the lot fell to the king's daughter. She was left in the swamp to face the dragon, and this is where St. George finds her during his travels. In a fierce combat, George defeats the dragon but does not kill it. Instead, he ties the princess' waistband around the dragon's neck and has her lead it back to the city. There he promises to slay the dragon if the people will embrace the Christian faith. This they agree to do, and he kills the dragon. Later, of course, the dragon came to represent the embodiment of evil and hatred rather than an animal, but the moral remained. The heroism and faith of S...

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  9:07
• #WavellReviews The Accidential Soldier by Owain Mulligan

  The Accidental Soldier is hilariously excellent - a laugh-out-loud memoir that delivers a sweet blend of comedy and storytelling. It brings British military humour vividly to life, while also navigating the serious terrain of leadership through war, fear, hope, and aspiration. It reads like a screenplay in waiting, and would make a brilliant film. Owain Mulligan, a frustrated teacher and self-declared weekend warrior (a "STAB" in old Army lingo), signs up for a tour in Iraq with the Queen's Royal Hussars in a bid for change. What follows is his story as a troop leader, a far punchier job that he had signed up for. The book is filled with comic moments. Nearly every page contains a witty remark or a hilarious anecdote - from felt-tip penis graffiti in Basra Palace to bizarre and endearing interactions with Iraqis. The opening page talks of there being too much mastaubation in the draft, but the humour is actually far more sophisticated. Mulligan's tone is light-hearted, and for veterans, the authenticity of his experience rings true, even if there are some embellishments. For civilian readers, it might leave the risky impression that war is…fun. Yet beneath the humour lies something deeper. Mulligan's comedy often feels like a mask, concealing frustration, anger, and sorrow behind a stoic façade. His writing invites empathy, and his portrayal of friction between units, allied forces, or the Foreign Office, is handled with both humour and humility. For example, being stopped for his ID card by an American soldier or interactions with obviously corrupt Iraqi officials. Beyond the storytelling, The Accidental Soldier offers an important perspective. It gives a glimpse into how soldiers truly felt during their time in Iraq. Mulligan's frustrations with the Iraqi Army and Police are clear, though often cloaked in humour. By the book's end, he begins to ask the harder questions: Was it worth it? His answer "I didn't make it any worse", is offered as a kind of modest victory. This is not a mocking critique of the war. Mulligan's deep respect for Iraq and its people is evident throughout. His sense of duty, while often buried beneath comedy, is unmistakable. The book also tackles the challenges of leadership, from handling cultural differences to dealing with death. One might come away thinking Mulligan found leadership easy - but 19 years of hindsight have surely softened the harder edges. Still, there are moments when the humour fades and the rawness of memory shines through, especially in the final pages. These scenes offer a jarring but necessary reminder of war's reality - and mark a turning point in how the book should be understood. His interaction with a local complaining about their strategy or the frustration about not being able to do more comes through as critical notes. At first glance, The Accidental Soldier might seem like another in the vein of The Junior Officers' Reading Club or Doug Beattie's numerous memoirs. It's both like them and not. The heart of this book lies in bringing the human experience to life, with humour as its main weapon. Discussing the book through The Wavell Room, we finished it feeling this was a genuine reflection - one written with respect, and one that adds real authenticity to the genre. The Accidental Soldier is brilliant. It's hilarious. It's laugh-out-loud funny. A confident 11/10. A copy of The Accidental Soldier was provided to The Wavell Room by the Publisher.

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  3:54
• Cheap is good enough

  With the imminent publication of the new government's first Strategic Defence Review this article throws out a challenge. Can we make the first cheap British Army division of the modern period? Can we afford not to? The 'world-beating' delusion Britain has a 'world-beating' epidemic. It would be funny if we were not paying such a high cost for this delusion. Who started it may be debated. That it has become an empty boast is indisputable. The graph below shows the frequency of use of the phrase in Parliament. It has only got worse. How is Britain world-beating? Our social statistics certainly attract attention: 40% of adults pay no income tax, because their annual income does not exceed the £12,570 personal allowance threshold; One third of 35-45 year olds in England now rents (it was one in ten at the beginning of the century), and four in every ten of the private renters is receiving housing benefit (or they would be on the street); By the time Universal Credit is fully rolled out, one in four working age households will be receiving it; Almost one fifth of Britain's school children, apparently, have special educational needs; At the other end of the scale, Britain's graduates now collectively owe around £240 billion in student loans; Over one million16-24 years olds are neither in education, employment nor training (the NEETs), the main reason cited is 'mental health', remedied by a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (over 3.3 million Britons in England and Wales were claiming a PIP last year). And so we could go on. How the British Army is 'world-beating' also raises questions. Marlborough's Grand Alliance army at the beginning of the 18th century was bigger. Cromwell had more cavalry regiments. The country that invented the tank can today deploy and sustain one tank regiment (plainly, there must be a reserve or you would be unable to rotate troops). The British Army is effectively air defenceless. In one of the most painful sagas of many in recent times, the Army will finally be receiving a new armoured personnel carrier, 20 years late, and with no weapon beyond a machinegun. And personnel statistics, perhaps reflecting wider society, do not make happy reading. Just five years ago, around 4,500 service personnel brought claims against the MOD. Today the number has jumped to almost 7,000 - or roughly, one in every 17th serviceman or woman on a parade square is making a claim against the MOD. Is serving in the (smaller) non-operational Army really so dangerous? Has the MOD become more negligent in the last five years? We can't go on like this. The first thing we must do is face reality and drop the 'world-beating' delusion. Good, better, best In the early 1960s, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara - America's most talented holder of the post in the second half of the 20th century - coined the phrase 'Good, better, best', in an interview with LIFE magazine. The Ford 'whizz kid' ('human IBM machine' was his other nickname) had been recruited by Kennedy to reform the bloated Department of Defence. He did, against some opposition. 'Good, better, best' referred to defence kit. The majority of defence kit, McNamara argued, just needs to be good. A small proportion needs to be better. And the smallest proportion needs to be 'the best'. The reason was cost. If each of the services proposed the best kit, every time, the defence budget would be bankrupted. Who knows what McNamara would make of Washington's trillion dollar defence budget today. His wisdom is certainly missed. Or cheap is good enough Or, perhaps, we could shorten McNamara's dictum and simply state cheap is good enough, most of the time. We were good at cheap. It was the foundation for what today would be called 'success stories'. The Land Rover story began in 1947 with Rover responding to a War Department requirement for a cheap, jeep-like, utility vehicle. Millions have since rolled off the production line. In contrast, a recently procured patrol vehicle (this auth...

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  12:01
• A Nuclear Dilemma: Peacekeeping in Ukraine

  Introduction President Donald Trump's attempt to end the war in Ukraine continues, but for how much longer? He has recently stated that his patience is wearing thin. Even if a meaningful ceasefire materialises, the extent to which the U.S. might provide security guarantees is still unknown. One thing that appears to be clear is that European nations will be taking the lead in any peacekeeping force used to enforce whatever peace deal might be negotiated, and that NATO security guarantees, such as Article 5, may not extend to this force. This poses a unique risk when it comes to potential nuclear escalation should further conflict occur in the future. A lack of NATO security guarantees may leave a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine vulnerable to nuclear strike. A brief hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate this. The year is 2029… President Donald Trump is coming towards the end of his second term as president, and it looks like a more pro-Ukraine candidate is going to be elected. Russia, having seen a significant easing of sanctions as part of a peace deal, has reconstituted and improved its military capability and learned its mistakes from the 2022 invasion. Worried by the possibility that the U.S. will soon be more likely to intervene to defend Ukraine, President Putin decides to act. After conducting a series of false flag operations - designed to look like Ukrainian aggression - Russia launches another invasion, banking on the European peacekeeping force being unwilling to take significant casualties, and the U.S. not intervening. However, Russia still suffers from significant command and control issues, and the European nations have also improved their own military capabilities. Russian forces make little progress and suffer heavy casualties - European casualties remain surprisingly limited. In Moscow, the prospect of another failed military operation sees pressure mounting on Putin - talks of a coup swirl. Putin decides to make good on a threat that was now falling on deaf ears. Russia launches a SS-26 Stone SSM with a 10-kiloton tactical warhead. Deliberately used in a less kinetic area of the front, targeting reconnaissance forces proving routes for a potential advance, the military impact of the detonation was limited, as was intended by Russia; however, the strategic impact was huge. With the U.S. still unwilling to provide material support, despite overwhelming condemnation of Russia's actions, Europe and Ukraine struggle to come up with a response, with Russia threatening further use of its tactical nuclear weapons. Sheltering under a Anglo-French umbrella? Anyone with a vague knowledge of the Ukraine conflict could probably poke holes in the scenario above, but it illustrates a point. A peacekeeping force in Ukraine may face the risk of nuclear escalation by Russia. The U.K. and France may offer to have Ukraine under their 'nuclear umbrella'; however, with only strategic weapons at their disposal, a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike would be grossly disproportionate. Given this, any force in Ukraine needs to ensure it can deal with a nuclear strike in a conventional way. This will include ensuring maneuver forces can continue to operate in a nuclear environment, as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia will likely, at least in part, be designed to limit freedom of movement. Fighting in a nuclear environment A nuclear strike would require a military force to deal with a number of challenges. The blast itself will almost certainly lead to casualties, just like a conventional munition. The thermal radiation of even a 10-kiloton warhead is likely to cause anything flammable within hundreds of meters to ignite and cause severe burns to those in the vicinity. Ionizing radiation will soon see cases of radiation sickness beginning to appear, which, even if not fatal, will require specialized medical treatment. Residual radiation from unfissioned weapon debris and radioactive fission ...

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