Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [23-1239] Barnes v. Felix

  Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?

  --------  

  1:15:56
• [23-1007] Cunningham v. Cornell University

  Cunningham v. Cornell University Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Casey Cunningham.Respondent: Cornell University. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioners) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cornell University administered two retirement plans for its employees: the Retirement Plan and the TDA Plan. As of 2016, these defined-contribution plans had over 30,000 participants and nearly $3.4 billion in combined net assets. Cornell delegated administrative responsibilities to its Vice President for Human Resources and established the Retirement Plan Oversight Committee (RPOC) to oversee the plans. The plans offered approximately 300 investment options and incurred investment management and recordkeeping fees, with TIAA-CREF and Fidelity Investments serving as both investment providers and recordkeepers. Plaintiffs, representing a class of plan beneficiaries, sued Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries in federal district court, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including failure to adequately monitor the plans, resulting in the retention of underperforming investment options and excessive fees, as well as engaging in prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. § 1106. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims, and the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claim before the court entered final judgment. The plaintiffs challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment on two counts, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court. Question Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?

  --------  

  1:30:43
• [23-1187] Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.

  Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2025. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration.Respondent: R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Ryan J. Watson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) These cases arise from the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) denial of R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.’s applications to market various e-cigarettes, including menthol- and berry-flavored “Alto” e-cigarettes. R.J. Reynolds, along with retail entities like Avail Vapor Texas and the Mississippi Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Stores Association, challenged this denial in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The FDA filed a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer, arguing that the petitioners do not meet the venue requirements set forth in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act for filing their petition in the Fifth Circuit. The case was consolidated with previous related cases, and the court had previously ruled that venue was proper in the Fifth Circuit in a related matter. In the present matter, the Fifth Circuit stood by its prior decision that venue was proper. Question May a manufacturer file a petition for review in a circuit where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located within that circuit?

  --------  

  1:12:11
• [23-1226] McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation

  McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2025. Petitioner: McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc.Respondent: McKesson Corporation. Advocates: Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the Petitioner) Joseph R. Palmore (for the Respondents) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) True Health Chiropractic, Inc. and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. filed a class action lawsuit against McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited advertisements via fax. They claimed they neither invited nor gave permission to receive these faxes, and even if there was permission or an established business relationship, the faxes lacked the required opt-out notice. The district court initially granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on McKesson's consent defenses. The court also decertified the proposed class and denied treble damages to the plaintiffs. McKesson appealed the summary judgment decision on their consent defenses. The plaintiffs cross-appealed the class decertification and denial of treble damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo, the decertification order for abuse of discretion, and the denial of treble damages for abuse of discretion, ultimately affirming all of the district court’s decisions. Question Does the Hobbs Act require a federal district court to accept the Federal Communication Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?

  --------  

  1:13:52
• [23-1122] Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

  Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2025. Petitioner: Free Speech Coalition, Inc.Respondent: Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Texas enacted H.B. 1181, a law regulating commercial entities that publish or distribute material on internet websites, including social media platforms, where more than one-third of the content is sexual material harmful to minors. The law requires these entities to implement age verification methods to limit access to adults and display specific health warnings on their landing pages and advertisements. It defines sexual material harmful to minors using a modified version of the Miller test for obscenity. Shortly after the law was enacted but before it took effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming H.B. 1181 violates their First Amendment rights and, for some plaintiffs, conflicts with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The district court issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and suffer irreparable harm. The court ruled that the age-verification requirement and health warnings fail strict scrutiny—that is, that it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means to achieve that interest—and that Section 230 preempts H.B. 1181 for certain plaintiffs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that rational basis review—i.e., rationally related to a legitimate government interest—was the proper standard of review and thus vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement but affirmed as to the health warnings. Question Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?

  --------  

  2:05:31

More Government podcasts

Trending Government podcasts

About Supreme Court Oral Arguments