The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

In podcast episode 128, posted just before Operation Epic Fury began, I outlined how I think that an attack on Iran could be just, necessary, and what I perceived as a path to achieve the goals expressed by the U.S. Government in the weeks leading to the start of the war. I did not expect this to be a blueprint for what would actually happen. What I really did not expect was for the conduct of the war to be completely different that that. So different that more than the usual naysayers are questioning whether this war is just at all, or winnable. In this episode I go beyond the Just War Theory I used in my previous analysis, using the Weinberger-Powell model for the use of military force. This model is credited with successful use of American military force in the last decade and a half of the 20th century. Although it is not, and was never intended as a recipe for success, abandoning its thought process seems to have been a formula for failure.

As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.

 

Dedication to my sons, 1st Lt Miles Mayer USAF and PFC Charles Mayer USA. With the commitment to our future military engagements being jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

 

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (1984) Promulgated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Believed to have been written by then Maj Gen Colin Powell, his senior military assistant.

The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.

S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.

U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.

The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.

The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.

 

General Colin Powell’s re-statement of the Doctrine in 1992, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Is a vital national security interest threatened?

Do we have a clear attainable objective?

Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?

Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?

Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?

Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?

Is the action supported by the American people?

Do we have genuine broad international support?

If after careful consideration of these questions, the decision is made to commit U.S. military forces, then two imperatives shall apply:

 

Clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.

When we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively.

 

Reference: Powell, C. “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93

Music: Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

In the last episode, I said that I would compare we know about Operation Epic Fury against the Weinberger-Powell doctrine for the use of American military force. I need to push that off for a week. Current events – and some pushback from my previous episode – require me to revisit my assessment of Just Cause in our attacking Iran.  I stand by my initial assessment in Episode 128, which I recorded before our attack. In that episode I expressed my opinion that Humanitarian Intervention was a valid argument for both Just Cause and Last Resort. Nonetheless, I included a caveat from that episode where I said that the reality of a military operation against Iran would probably look different than what I proposed. It has, and so a review is important.

The information in this podcast is my own opinion and does not represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other organization I am or have previously been associated with.

Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive

Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

I keep on trying to podcast about other things and current events keep distracting me. In my previous episode in this series, “The Persian Problem, I described some conditions under which U.S. military action against Iran would meet the Jus Ad Bellum criteria of Just War Theory. That description was, at the time I posted it, theoretical. Now we have the reality of having initiated combat operations. In this episode, I will review what I said in the previous episode and compare it to what we can see so far in this current conflict.

Music:

Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive

Kiilstofte, J., The Cavalry, Machinamasound (Licensed)

By the time anyone reads or listens to this podcast, the situation with Iran may be completely different than when I write this. In keeping with the intent of this podcast series, however, I thought it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of intervention in Iran in a way that is in line with the enduring principles of war. In doing this I am not advocating such an intervention. Neither do I express any opinion about whether or not it is even a good idea. My intent is to frame a possible military intervention within the framework of time proven successful strategy and Just War criteria. Given the record of U.S. military interventions following the first Gulf War, I am confident that whatever we do regarding Iran will completely ignore that framework.

 

Music:

Copland, A. & United States Marine Band. (2000) Fanfare for the Common Man. unpublished, Washington, DC. [Audio] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, (Fair use for educational purposes.)

Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)

Can strategic bombing of cities ever be justified? In the previous episode of this podcast series (E126), Col. Altieri said that the air force always considers itself revolutionary. Before I began recording, he cited strategic bombing in World War Two as both revolutionary and consistent with Clausewitz’s concept of making things so painful that the enemy will not continue to resist. I responded, saying that strategic bombing of the civilian population was a war crime and violates Just War criteria. Afterwards, I thought my response might have been hasty. In this episode, I re-look the idea of strategic bombardment, not as we might see it today, but as it was believed during WWII. In any examination of history, we need to see things as they were understood by those making decisions at that time, not from our current perspective.

 

Music: Holst, G. The Planets: Mars Bringer of War, downloaded from Internet Archive