The High Court Report

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026
Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty.
Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.
For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.
Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split.
Main Arguments:
Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review.
Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide.

Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement.
Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts.
Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing.
Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims.

Implications:
(1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers;
(2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review;
(3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar.

The Fine Print:
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment"
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision"

Primary Cases:
United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal.
Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview
[00:01:00] Oral Advocates
[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins
[00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement
[00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions
[00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions
[00:45:07] United States Opening Statement
[00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions
[01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions
[01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026
Interview with Adeel Bashir: Here
Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users.
Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence.
Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Main Arguments:
Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief.
Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it.

Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.
Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how."
Separate Opinions:
Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation.
Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification.
Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards."

Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched.
The Fine Print:
Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition."

Primary Cases:
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest.
United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated.

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.
For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026
Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty.
Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.
Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split.
Main Arguments:
Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review.
Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide.

Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.
Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement.
Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts.
Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing.
Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims.

Implications:
(1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers;
(2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review;
(3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar.

The Fine Print:
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment"
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision"

Primary Cases:
United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal.
Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control.

Oral Advocates:
For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.
For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026
Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.
Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.
Main Arguments:
T.M. (Petitioner):
(1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman;
(2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;
(3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.

UMD Medical System (Respondent):
(1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review;
(2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed;
(3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.

Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.
Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;
(2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;
(3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.
Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate.

Implications:
(1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first;
(2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation;
(3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive.

The Fine Print:
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."
28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Primary Cases:
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.

Timestamps:
[00:00:00] Argument Preview
[00:01:15] Oral Advocates
[00:01:27] Argument Begins
[00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement
[00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions
[00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions
[00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement
[00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions
[00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions
[00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026
Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.
Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.
Main Arguments:
T.M. (Petitioner):
(1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman;
(2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;
(3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.

UMD Medical System (Respondent):
(1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review;
(2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed;
(3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.

Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.
Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Opinion: Here
Majority Reasoning:
(1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;
(2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;
(3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.

Separate Opinions:
Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.
Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate.

Implications:
(1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first;
(2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation;
(3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive.

The Fine Print:
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."
28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Primary Cases:
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.

Oral Advocates:
Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLP
Respondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP