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How to Navigate U.S.-China Tensions
Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research and Public Policy Michael Zezas discuss the latest developments in U.S.-China relations and how they could affect investors.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Michael Zezas, Global Head of Fixed Income Research and Public Policy Strategy. Today, we’re talking about the U.S. and China—why the relationship remains complicated, and what it means for markets. It’s Tuesday, Oct 21st, at 12:30pm in New York. If you’ve been following headlines, you know that U.S.-China relations are rarely out of the news. But beneath the surface, the dynamics are more nuanced than the daily soundbytes suggest. Investors often ask: Are we headed for a decoupling of the two economies, or is there room for cooperation? The answer, as always, is—it’s complicated. Let’s start with the basics. The U.S. and China are deeply intertwined economically, but strategic competition has intensified. Recent years have seen tariffs, export controls, and restrictions on technology transfer. Yet, there’s still plenty of trade between the two countries, and both economies are dependent on each other for growth and innovation. So what’s going on now? In recent weeks, China has moved to tighten rare earth export controls and the U.S. has proposed 100 percent tariffs in return. If this came to pass, these events could mark a clear economic split. But given the interdependencies we just cited, neither Washington nor Beijing seems eager for a true split, at least not anytime soon. The economic costs would be staggering, and both sides know it. So, a truce seems more likely, perhaps with somewhat different terms than the narrow semis-for-rare earths agreement they made this spring. And longer term, this episode seems to be a part of a broader dynamic, where rolling negotiations and truces are more likely than either a durable trade peace or a hard economic decoupling. For fixed income investors, this drives some important considerations. First, U.S. industrial policy is ramping up, with clear implications for AI infrastructure. AI is an area where the U.S. views it as essential that they outcompete China. Supported by renewed CapEx incentives from the latest tax bill, it’s clear to us that U.S. companies will be pushing further into AI development, where my colleagues have identified $2.9 trillion of data center financing needs over the next three years, about half of which will come from various credit markets. And for credit investors, this presents an important opportunity. Another consideration is how markets will balance near-term growth risks with an array of medium term growth possibilities. As our U.S. economics team has pointed out, the evidence suggests that corporates haven’t yet been forced to make tough decisions about passing on or absorbing tariff costs, underscoring that trade-related growth pressures aren’t yet in the rearview. The ongoing U.S. government shutdown doesn’t help either. It’s all a good argument for why bond yields could move lower in the near term. But also, we should expect yield curves could steepen more, with higher relative yields in longer maturities. This would reflect greater uncertainties around higher fiscal deficits, inflation, and economic growth. Our economists have been calling out the mixed messages in economic data, as well as a U.S. fiscal sustainability picture that appears reliant on acceleration in corporate CapEx for a manufacturing and AI-driven growth burst. In sum, the U.S.-China relationship is evolving, with global implications that don’t lend themselves to easy narratives or quick fixes. Our challenge will continue to be crafting investment strategies that reflect durable policy undercurrents, the signal amid news headline noise. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague.
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Time for a Bull Market Correction?
As the S&P 500 continues to rally, our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson discusses three factors that could lead to a stock market correction in the near term.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley's CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast I'll be discussing why we are still in a new bull market even if a correction is likely in the near term. It's Monday, October 20th at 1pm in New York. So, let's get after it. I continue to believe the sharp selloff in April following Liberation Day marked the trough of what was effectively a three-year rolling recession in the U.S. economy. We have written extensively about this view; but it still remains very much out of consensus. Since 2022 most sectors of the private economy have gone through their own individual recession but at different times. The final trough in the rate of change in economic activity came in April around the tariff announcements which came as a surprise to almost everyone, at least in terms of the magnitude and scope. In short, Liberation Day was really capitulation day on the last piece of bad news for the economic cycle which then bottomed. Stocks seem to agree which is why they have rallied in a straight line since then, much like they do after the trough in any economic cycle. The other proof we have for this claim is the v-shaped recovery in earnings revision breadth, something we have discussed for many months in our written research and on this podcast. Based on our numerous conversations with investors, this view remains very unpopular. Instead, most believe the economy and earnings growth for next year are at risk of being lower rather than higher than expected, as I do. Core to my view is that we are now firmly in an inflationary regime since COVID and the implementation of helicopter money to get us out of that crisis. The government has to run it hot to get us out of the massive debt and deficit problem created over the past 20 years. The end result is that investors need to expect hotter but shorter cycles rather than the elongated 10-year cycles we experienced between 1980-2020 when inflation was falling. That means two-year up cycles followed by one-year down cycles for U.S. equity markets, which is exactly what's happened since 2020. We are now in the midst of a new up cycle that began in April. The key thing to understand during this new regime is that inflation is not bad for stocks so long as it's accelerating and the Fed is on the sidelines or easing like in 2020-21, 2023 and now today. Higher inflation means higher earnings growth which is why price earnings multiples are high today. With inflation likely to accelerate next year, stocks are anticipating better earnings growth. In other words, stocks are a hedge against inflation. In fact, relative to gold, high quality stocks may offer a cheaper inflation hedge at this point given their dramatic underperformance to precious metals year-to-date and since 2021. Eventually, inflation will be a problem again for stocks like in 2022 when the Fed has to react by tightening policy, but that's a story for another day. Having said all this, the equity markets are a bit frothy at the moment and so a 10-15 percent correction in the S&P 500 is not only possible but would be normal at this stage of a new bull market. I see three primary reasons for why we could get that in the near term. First, China-U.S. trade relations have recently escalated again, and we are slowly marching toward a November 1st deadline for tariffs on China to go back to Liberation Day levels. While most investors don't want to get sucked into selling at the worst possible time like they did in April, this risk is real and will weigh on stocks if we don't see evidence of a de-escalation in the next few weeks. Second, funding markets have exhibited some signs of increased stress lately. This is likely due to the ongoing quantitative tightening program by the Fed which is draining bank reserves. Should these stresses increase, it could spill over into equities. Third, our earnings revision breadth metric is rolling over now after its historic rise since April. This could continue into earnings season as it's normal to see some retracement from such a high level and tariffs start to flow through from inventories to the income statement. Trade tensions might also weigh on company guidance in the short term. Bottom line, I believe a new bull market began in April with a new rolling economic and earnings recovery that is now quite nascent. However, even new bull markets have corrections along the way, and certain conditions argue we are at risk for the first tradable one since April. Keep your powder dry in the near term for what should be a great buying opportunity, if it arrives. Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!
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U.S.-China Tensions: What Could Happen Next?
Our U.S. Public Policy Strategist Ariana Salvatore unpacks how China’s announced rare earth export controls and signals of sweeping U.S. tariffs could impact global supply chains, markets and economic growth.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Public Policy Strategist. Today I'll talk about a development keeping markets and investors on alert: a re-escalation of U.S. China trade tensions. It's Friday, October 17th at 10am in New York. Since April, the U.S. and China have been in what we've been calling a very delicate detente. Remember, President Trump paused the additional reciprocal tariffs after Liberation Day. Since then, we've been consistently skeptical that the pause was durable enough to actually allow the U.S. and China to come up with a full-fledged trade agreement. But now we're equally as skeptical that the current escalation will lead to a material disruption in the bilateral relationship. So, what happened last week? China announced stricter export controls on rare earths, which are really critical for manufacturing everything from electric vehicles to defense equipment and advanced electronics. So, in response, the Trump administration on Friday announced a proposed 100 percent tariff, said to go into effect November 1st across all Chinese exports to the U.S. That date matters because that's around the same time that Presidents Trump and Xi were scheduled to meet at the upcoming APEC Summit in South Korea. When we think about this most recent escalation, it's pretty significant because China accounts for about 70 percent of global rare earth mining, and 90 percent of processing and refining. A lot of countries around the world – the U.S. Japan, Korea, and Germany – all rely heavily on these imports from China. And so potential new export controls mean that every economy may have to start negotiating bilaterally with China to secure supplies, which raises the risk of supply chain disruption across Asia, Europe, and the U.S. Looking ahead, we're thinking about four potential scenarios for how the current U.S.-China trade tensions could play out. The most likely outcome, which is our base case, is a return to the recent status quo following a period of rhetorical escalation and likely a reset of expectations heading into this APEC meeting. That's because we think both the U.S. and China would prefer to maintain the existing equilibrium to an abrupt supply chain decoupling. That equilibrium is effectively chips for rare earths. So, the U.S. receives China's rare earths, and then in return the U.S. exports some of its chips to China. But that equilibrium doesn't necessarily mean that the temporary implementation of trade barriers like higher tariffs or more export controls are off the table. The broader trajectory we think will continue to point toward competitive confrontation, which is a bipartisan strategy that encompasses both these traditional trade tactics as well as unilateral domestic investment – either vis-a-vis direct federal spending, or the government taking more stakes in companies involved in these critical industries. So, think things like the IRA, the CHIPS Act, and other bipartisan pieces of legislation. So, in the near and medium term, expect to see these trade barriers persisting and a bipartisan push toward U.S. industrial policy, as the U.S. attempts to undergo selective de-risking from China. Our base case scenario anticipates further short-term tensions, but ultimately a limited agreement that avoids deep structural changes. We've also thought through some alternate scenarios. So, in one downside case, you could see temporary escalation past November 1st. Both sides could fully implement their proposed policies, but after doing so, come back to the status quo once the economic costs become apparent. A more severe downside scenario involves durable escalation. So, in this case, we would see both countries maintain trade barriers for an extended period. That outcome would see both the U.S. and China decide to change calculus on that equilibrium, so that no longer holds. And in that case, we could see a push toward decoupling and a significant strain on supply chains. Finally, our last scenario reflects a quick de-escalation in which heightened rhetoric actually acts as a catalyst for renewed negotiations and a potential framework agreement that could result in some tariffs, but most likely at lower levels than initially proposed. So, what does this all mean? In the base case, our economists expect China's GDP growth to slow to below 4.5 percent in the second half of 2025, with exports supported by robust non-U.S. shipments. Our equity strategists in this outcome see the volatility actually providing a dip buying opportunity, given that they see a rolling recovery that began earlier this year. However, a more durable escalation could possibly prolong China's deflation and necessitate further policy adjustments. Similarly, that outcome could negate the early cycle rolling recovery thesis here in the U.S. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
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Credit Market’s Three Big Debates
With Morgan Stanley’s European Leveraged Finance Conference underway, our Head of Corporate Credit Research Andrew Sheets joins Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur to discuss private credit, M&A activity and AI infrastructure.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Head of Corporate Credit Research at Morgan StanleyVishy Tirupattur: And I'm Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist.Andrew Sheets: Today, as we're hosting the Morgan Stanley European Leveraged Finance Conference, a discussion of three of the biggest topics on the minds of credit investors worldwide.It's Thursday, October 16th at 4pm in London.Vishy, it's so great to catch up with you here in London. I know you've been running around the world, quite literally, talking to investors about some of the biggest debates in credit – and that's exactly what we wanted to talk. We're here at Morgan Stanley's European Leveraged Finance Conference. We're talking with investors about the biggest debates, the biggest developments in credit markets, and there are really kind of three topics that stand out.There's what's going on with private credit? What's going on with the merger and acquisition, the M&A cycle? And how are we going to fund all of this AI infrastructure?And so maybe I'll throw the first question to you. We hear a lot about private credit, and so maybe just for the listener who's looking at a lot of different things. First, how do you define it? What are we really talking about when we're talking about private credit?Vishy Tirupattur: So, Andrew, when we talk about private credit, the most common understanding of private credit is lending by non-banks to small and medium sized companies. And we probably will discuss a bit later that this definition is actually expanding much beyond this narrow definition. So, when you think about private credit and spend time understanding what is the credit in private credit, what it boils down to is on average, on a leveraged basis, the credit in private credit is comparable to, say CCC to B - on a coverage basis to the public markets.So, the credits in the private credit market are weaker. But on the other hand, the quality of covenants in these deals is significantly better compared to the public credit markets. So, that's the credit in private credit.Andrew Sheets: So, Vishy, with that in mind then, what is the concern in this market? Or conversely, where do people see the opportunity?Vishy Tirupattur: So, the concern in this market comes from the opaqueness in these deals. Many of these private credit borrowers are not public filers. So not much is well known about what the underlying details are. But in a sense, a good part of the public markets, whether it's in high yield bonds or in the public, broadly syndicated leveraged loans are also not public filers. So, there is information asymmetry in those markets as well.So, the issue is not the opaqueness of private markets, but opaqueness in credit in general. But that said, when you look at the metrics of leverage, coverage, cash on balance sheet…Andrew Sheets: Because we can get some kind of high-level sense of what is in these portfolios...Vishy Tirupattur: Yeah. And we look at all those metrics, and we look at a wide range of metrics. We don't get to the conclusion that we are at a precipice of some systemic risk exposure in credit. On the other hand, there are idiosyncratic issues. And these idiosyncratic issues have always been there and will remain there. And we would expect that the default rates are sticky around these levels, which are slightly above the long-term average levels, and we expect that to remain.Andrew Sheets: So, you may see more dispersion within these portfolios. These are weaker, more cyclical, more levered companies. But overall, this is not something that we think at the moment is going to interrupt the credit cycle or the broader markets dynamic.Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely. That is exactly where we come down to.So, Andrew, let me throw another question back at you. There's a lot of talk of growing M&A, growing LBO activity. And that could potentially lead to some challenges on the credit front. How do you look at it?Andrew Sheets: So, I'd like to actually build upon your answer from private credit, right? Because I think a lot of the questions that we're getting from investors are around this question of how far along in this always, kind of, cyclical process; ebb and flow of lending aggressiveness are we? And, you know, this is a cycle that goes back a hundred years – of lenders becoming more conservative and tighter with lending. And then as times get good, they become somewhat looser. And initially that's fine. And then eventually something, something happens.And so, I think we've seen the development of new markets like private credit that have opened up new lending opportunities and then also new questions. And I think we've also seen this question come up around M&A and corporate activity.And as we start to see headlines of very large leveraged buyouts or LBOs, as we start to see more merger and acquisition – M&A – activity coming back; something we've at Morgan Stanley been believers in. Are we really starting to see the things that we saw in the year 2000, or in the year 2007, when you saw very active capital markets actually coinciding with kind of near the peak of equity markets near the top of major market cycles.And in short, we do not think we're there yet. If we look at the actual volumes that we're seeing, we're actually a little bit below average in terms of corporate activity. There's really been a dearth of corporate activity after COVID. We're still catching up. Secondly, the big transactions that we're seeing are still more conservatively structured, which isn't usually what you see right at the end. And so, I think between these two things with still a lot of supportive factors for more corporate activity, we think we have further to go.Vishy Tirupattur: On that point, Andrew, I think if you look at the LBOs that are happening today versus the LBOs that happened in the 2007 era, the equity contribution is dramatically different. You know, equity to debt, these LBOs that are happening today [are] of a substantially higher amount of equity contribution compared to the LBOs we saw pre-Financial Crisis…Andrew Sheets: That's such a great point. And the listener may not know this, but Vishy and I were working together at Morgan Stanley prior to the Financial Crisis, and we were working in credit research when a lot of these LBOs were happening, and…Vishy Tirupattur: And I used to be tall and good looking.Andrew Sheets: (laughs) And they were just very different. We're still not there. If you go back and pull the numbers, you're looking at transactions still that are far more conservative than what we saw then. So, you know, this activity is cyclical, and I think we do have to watch deregulation, right? You saw a lot of regulations come in after the Financial Crisis that led to more conservative lending. If those regulations get rolled back, we could really move back towards more aggressive lending. But we haven't quite seen that yet.Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely not.Andrew Sheets: And Vishy, maybe the third question that comes up a lot. We've covered private credit, which is very topical. We've covered kind of corporate aggressiveness. But maybe the icing on the cake. The biggest question is AI – and is AI spending?And it just feels like every day you come into the office and there's another headline on CNBC or Bloomberg about another mega AI funding deal. And the question is, okay, where's all that money going to come from?And maybe some of it comes from these companies themselves. They’re very profitable, but credit might have to fill in some of the gaps. And you and some of our colleagues have done a lot of work on this. Where do you think kind of the lending story and the borrowing story fits into this broader AI theme?Vishy Tirupattur: Our estimate of simply data center related CapEx requirements are close to $3 trillion. You add the power required for the data centers and add another $300-400 billion. So, a lot of this CapEx will come from – roughly about half might come from the operating cash flows of the hyperscalers. But the rest, so [$]1.5 trillion plus, has to come through various channels of credit.So, unsecured corporate credit, we think will play a fairly small role in this. Of that [$]1.5 trillion plus, maybe [$]200 billion to come from unsecured credit issuance by these hyperscalers, and perhaps some of the securitized markets, such as ABS and CMBS that rely on stabilized cash flows may be another 1[$]50 billion. But a different version of private credit, what we will call ABF or asset based finance, will play a very big role. So north of [$]800 billion we think will come from that kind of a private credit version of investment grade, or a private credit markets developing. So, this market is very much in the developmental mode.So, one way or the other, for AI to go from where it is today to substantially improving productivity and the earnings of companies that has to go through CapEx; and that CapEx needs to go through credit markets.Andrew Sheets: And I think that is so fascinating because, right Vishy, so much of the spending is still ahead of us. It hasn't even really started, if you look at the numbers.Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely. We are in the early stages of this CapEx cycle. We should expect to see a lot more CapEx and that CapEx train has to run through credit markets.Andrew Sheets: So, Vishy, there's obviously a lot of history in financial markets of larger CapEx booms, and some of them work out well, and some of them don't. I mean, if you are trying to think about some of the dynamics of this funding for AI and data centers more broadly versus some of these other CapEx cycles that investors might be familiar with. Are there some similar dynamics and some key differences that you try to keep in mind?Vishy Tirupattur: So, in terms of similarities, you know, they're big numbers, whichever way you cut it, these numbers are going to be big dollar numbers.But there are substantial differences between the most recent CapEx boom that we saw towards the end of the late 90s, early 2000s; we saw a massive telecom boom, telecom related CapEx. The big difference is that spending was done by – predominantly by companies that had put debt on their balance sheet. They were already very leveraged. They were just barely investment grade or some below investment grade companies with not much cash on their balance sheet.And you contrast that with today's world, much of this is being done by highly rated companies; the hyperscalers or between, you know, A+ to AAA rated companies, with a lot of cash on their balance sheets and with very little outstanding debt on their part.On top of that, the kind of channels that exist today, you know, data center, ABS and CMBS, asset-based finance, joint venture kind of financing. All of these channels were simply not available back then. And the fact that they all are available today means that this risk of CapEx is actually much more widely distributed.So that makes me feel a lot better about the evolution of this CapEx cycle compared to the most recent one we saw.Andrew Sheets: Private credit, a rise in M&A and a very active funding market for AI. Three big topics that are defining the credit debate today. Vishy, thanks for taking the time to talk.Vishy Tirupattur: Andrew, always fun to hang with youAndrew Sheets: And thank you for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us review wherever you listen and tell a friend or colleague about us today.
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Asia’s Youth Job Crisis
Our Chief Asia Economist Chetan Ahya discusses how youth unemployment will impact future growth and stability across China, India, and Indonesia.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Asia Economist. Today – Asia’s young workforce is facing a significant challenge. How a soft labor market will shape everything from consumer demand to social stability and long-term growth. It’s Tuesday, October 14th, at 2pm in Hong Kong. Across Asia, a concerning trend is emerging. The region’s younger generations face mounting challenges in the job market. Asia’s youth unemployment averages 16 percent, which is much higher than the U.S. rate of 10.5 percent. Youth unemployment rates are running two to three times higher than headline unemployment rates. The underlying situation is even weaker than what is represented by [the] unemployment rate. And within Asia, the challenge is most acute in China, India, and Indonesia, the three most populous economies. Youth unemployment rates for these three economies are running close to double, as compared to other economies in Asia. Now let’s take a closer look at China. The urban youth unemployment rate, i.e. for 16–24-year-olds, has steadily increased since 2019. What’s driving this rise in unemployment? A mismatch in labor demand and supply. The number of university graduates surged 40 percent over the last five years to close to 12 million. But economy-wide employment has declined by 20 million over the same period. Entry-level wages are sluggish, and automation plus subdued services growth mean fewer opportunities for newer entrants. Turning to India, their unemployment rate is the highest in the region at 17.6 percent. Employment creation has been subdued. And on top of it, India also faces another issue: underemployment. Post-COVID, primary sector – i.e. farming and mining – employment rose by 50 million, reaching a 17-year high. Note that these jobs are relatively low productivity jobs. And this is explained by the fact that [the] primary sector now accounts for less than 20 percent of GDP but it employs about 40 percent of the workforce. That’s a sign of COVID-induced underemployment. How fast must growth be to tackle the unemployment challenge? In our base case, India's GDP will grow at an average of 6.5 percent over the coming decade – and this will mean that India will be one of the fastest-growing economies globally. But this pace of growth will not be sufficient to generate enough jobs. To keep [the] unemployment rate stable, India needs an average GDP growth of close to 7.5 percent; and to address underemployment, the required run rate in GDP growth must be even higher at 12 percent. Shifting to Indonesia, its youth unemployment rate is the second highest in the region. Moreover, close to 60 percent of jobs are in the informal sector. And many of these jobs pay below minimum wage. Similar to India, both these trends signal underemployment. The key reason behind this challenge is weak investment growth. Indonesia's investment-to-GDP ratio has dropped meaningfully over the last five years. So, what’s the way forward? For China, shifting towards consumption and services could reduce labor market mismatches. And for India and Indonesia, boosting investment is key. India in particular needs much stronger growth in its industrial and exports sectors. If reforms fall short, policy makers may need to fall back on increasing social welfare spending to manage social stability risks. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
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