Helm Talks - energy climate infrastructure & more

Several key industries have fallen back to production levels last seen in the 1950s. Car production has dropped to its 1952 level at around 700,000 vehicles a year—down by nearly 1 million in a decade—while steel is a shadow of its former output. Even cement is falling back, being increasingly switched to imports. Housebuilding is far below its 1950s’ and 1960s’ levels. The fertiliser industry has closed. Net zero technology is overwhelmingly imported (e.g. the batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, critical minerals and now EVs ), now mostly from China.

Why? Deindustrialisation has multiple causes, exacerbated by the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. New digital technologies and data centres are highly energy‑intensive and need reliable, non-intermittent, round‑the‑clock electricity. The idea that we can simply become Singapore-on-Thames, relying on finance, law, tech, and hospitality, is at best naive. Traditional service sectors face rising costs from recent tax and wage policies, and global finance is becoming more fragmented and less open. Meanwhile, the UK continues to rely heavily on foreign investors to fund essential infrastructure, from water and energy to roads.

The UK needs to focus on three big areas: competitive business taxes; affordable and globally competitive energy prices; and major investment in skills. Raising employers' national insurance, raising the minimum wage, increasing workers’ rights and signing ever-higher contracts for offshore wind leave what is left of UK industry reaching for the exit. Instead, we need a switch from business costs and taxes to consumers. It isn’t sustainable for voters to enjoy 21st‑century living standards with 1950s’ outputs. It will take a brave politician to tell the public some of these basic facts of life.

Many people in the Labour Party support bringing utilities like water (in particular, Thames Water) and electricity transmission back into public ownership. Supporters often present nationalisation as a simple fix: no greedy investors, no dividends, and lower bills. But, in reality, nationalisation is far more complicated and involves real trade-offs that are often glossed over.

Financial risks of running these industries do not disappear when the state takes over. Under private ownership, investors bear the risk and expect returns through dividends and interest. Under nationalisation, that risk shifts to customers and taxpayers instead. If the government still borrows to fund investment, interest payments remain. If it wants to avoid borrowing, then customers would have to pay higher bills now to fund upgrades and maintenance — a return to the “pay-as-you-go” model used after the Second World War.

Nationalisation also wouldn’t automatically improve how these industries are run. The state once had strong expertise in managing utilities, but that capacity largely no longer exists. There is a risk that governments use nationalised industries for political goals, such as freezing prices, which can lead to underinvestment and reduce service quality. Anyone arguing for nationalisation needs to be honest that it likely means higher bills today, real financial risk for the public, and no guarantee of better performance.

As 2026 begins, and people look ahead to what it might bring, this podcast focuses on the likely, more profound, economic and geopolitical shifts expected by 2030 – now less than five years’ away. Immediate questions revolve around UK elections, leadership changes, and ongoing conflicts like Ukraine and Taiwan, but infrastructure, technology and economic planning require a longer-term perspective. By 2030, the world is likely to be more fragmented into economic and political blocs, with China, Russia, and the US reinforcing self-sufficiency, and emerging economies like India and Indonesia gaining prominence. Climate change progress is expected to remain minimal, and technological revolutions in AI and quantum computing may either transform industries or deliver incremental changes.

Of the possible shifts in the next five years, a significant global financial correction before 2030 appears the most likely, driven by unsustainable market valuations, private equity vulnerabilities, and mounting government debt. The aftermath could involve serious inflation and currency debasement, as governments resort to aggressive monetary interventions. This scenario would reshape political and economic models, potentially leading to more state intervention and less private sector influence.

Looking ahead, three possible trajectories for the UK and similar economies are outlined: continued muddling through with incremental adjustments; a radical re-set akin to a “Thatcher moment” to curb public spending and debt; or a protectionist “fortress Britain” approach emphasising self-sufficiency. Each path carries profound implications for trade, growth, and political stability. But financial markets seem most likely to act as the catalyst for systemic change before 2030.

Why is it that this government, and its predecessors, find economic growth so hard to attain? In the UK, growth remains stubbornly low for a number of reasons, and these are not the ones that the government is currently blaming. First, governments avoid hard choices and spread resources too thinly. As Tony Blair said to me many years ago, politicians prefer to have "and" over "or" – in his case, nuclear and renewables. Political instinct favours doing “everything” to please all parts of politicians’ constituencies, but this dilutes investment and prevents large-scale, coordinated programmes. Instead of comprehensive strategies like those seen in China or France, the UK pursues piecemeal, case-by-case projects, resulting in high costs and inefficiencies, such as probably the most expensive nuclear plants in the world (at c. £12 billion per gigawatt). Without focused, long-term infrastructure programmes, growth cannot accelerate.

Beyond this, structural issues compound the problem. Western economies, especially the UK, prioritise consumption over production, rely heavily on welfare spending, and maintain incentive systems that discourage work. High taxes and borrowing further stifle growth, while domestic savings – critical for funding investment – are minimal. Unlike post-war economic miracles in Germany, Japan and China, driven by savings and production, the UK depends on foreign capital and supply chains, leaving its economy vulnerable. A fundamental shift towards production, supported by domestic savings and programme-driven investment, is a prerequisite for sustainable growth.

There are five major lessons from COP30. They are not the ones the climate community has highlighted, but they really matter and will shape the post-COP30 climate change negotiations.
First up is the realisation that it is no longer a European (and UK) game. The shifts in world political and economic power for the first time sidelined the Europeans. There was no UK “climate change leadership” to be taken seriously. It is India, China, Russia and the US that pulled the strings, whether present or not. Second, no major oil and gas producer or coal-burning nation wants to stop. Brazil set the tone: it announced that it wants to be the world’s fourth-largest oil producer, with drilling to start in the mouth of the Amazon. Third, no one wants to cut their carbon consumption, personally or nationally. The Brazilian carbon footprint includes the flights, the new road through the rainforest, the cruise liners for accommodation, as well as the commitment to its own fossil fuels. Fourth, the real action was on the bottom-up trade issues, notably the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and the emerging coalition of the willing with the extension of carbon pricing. The fifth lesson is that the temperature is going to go on rising: 30 COPs so far haven’t made a dent in the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, and another 30 COPs probably won’t.